How cooperation can originate and be maintained in a society of selfish individuals is one of the central questions in evolutionary biology and social sciences. Formally, it can be posed in the context of the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) game where agents interact by either cooperating or defecting in each round, based on the information about their choices in previous rounds of the game. It has been recently shown that social dilemmas arising in single-stage games can be resolved in the co-action framework when the agents are in a completely symmetric situation. Here we examine the IPD from a co-action perspective and show that it allows cooperation to emerge and subsequently be sustained even in the presence of noise. Specifically, we show that the co-action equilibrium for an N -player IPD is a state in which a majority of cooperators coexist with defectors, the exact composition being determined by the ratio of the payoffs. For an IPD between two players, we show that the co-action solution corresponds to a win-stay, lose-shift behavioral rule, thereby providing a rational basis for this Pavlovian strategy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding how cooperation can emerge in a society, each of whose individual members are trying to maximize their personal well-being, is a long-standing problem with ramifications for diverse phenomena observed in biological, sociological and economic arenas [1] [2] [3] . In fact, cooperation may appear to be fragile even if it arises by chance because of the ever present temptation to not cooperate (thereby avoiding the cost associated with such an action) while enjoying the benefits of the cooperative acts of others. The paradigmatic problem which makes the questions associated with the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals concrete is the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) [4] . It provides a simple setting to demonstrate how the pursuit of maximal individual benefit could lead to a collective outcome that is disastrous for all. From its inception about six decades back, PD has remained a subject of detailed investigation in disciplines ranging from social sciences and game theory to evolutionary biology and physics [5] .
The single-stage PD represents the strategic interaction between two agents who have the choice to either cooperate (C) or defect (D). If both agents choose C, each receives a reward payoff R, while if they both choose D, each is penalized with a punishment payoff P < R. If they choose different actions, then the defector receives the highest payoff T > R (the temptation to defect) while the cooperator gets the lowest (or sucker's) payoff S < P . Thus, the payoffs are ordered as T > R > P > S, which according to standard game theoretic arguments yields defection as the dominant strategy. The dilemma in PD refers to the fact that while the Nash equilibrium is mu- * Electronic address: sasidevan@imsc.res.in † Electronic address: sitabhra@imsc.res.in tual defection, the players could have been better off had both of them instead chosen to cooperate.
When the game is placed in an iterative setting, it provides a platform for addressing the problem of evolution of cooperation. In contrast to the single stage game described above, the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) involves two players repeatedly playing the game for a finite or infinite number of times. Just as for the single stage game, mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium for a finitely repeated IPD, which can be easily shown by a backward induction argument. In an infinitely repeated IPD however, it is possible to have mutual cooperation as an equilibrium outcome, as indicated by folk theorems [6] . Generalizing the IPD to N (≥ 2) players allows investigation of public goods games in an iterative setting, where cooperation is more difficult to achieve [7] .
In contrast to the conventional wisdom that defection should be the preferred strategy of selfish agents, cooperation is seen to occur widely in nature. It is seen in biological systems ranging from microorganisms [8, 9] , cellular aggregates [10] and synthetic ecologies [11] to primate societies [12] . Human subjects playing PD in either single-stage or multiple round experiments do achieve some measure of cooperation (e.g., see Ref. [13] ). Understanding how such cooperation can emerge is most appropriately investigated in the context of repeated interactions between agents. In this case, agents can "remember" their past actions and the resulting outcomes, and they can use this information to govern their future decisions. Several mechanisms by which cooperation can emerge in such a scenario have been proposed [14] . These include kin selection [15] , direct reciprocity [16] , indirect reciprocity [17] , network reciprocity [18, 19] and group selection [20] , which are behavioral mechanisms by which cooperation can arise in real situations, e.g., through natural selection in biological evolution. Even within the conventional game theoretic framework, there have been formal attempts at modifying IPD so as to make cooper-ation viable, involving concepts such as ǫ-equilibria [21] , incomplete information [22] , bounded rationality [23] , absence of common knowledge about the rationality of players [24] and the number of iterations [25] , etc. All of the variations described above involve changing the original setting of IPD in one way or the other. In this paper, we re-examine the question of whether cooperation can arise in a society of rational, selfish individuals without ascribing to them any additional behavioral rules or properties. While the conventional answer to this is in the negative, we have recently shown that rational agents in symmetric game situations will play according to a solution concept -referred to as co-action -in which cooperation becomes viable in one-shot PD [26] .
We show that invoking the co-action equilibrium in the iterative setting allows for cooperation to emerge in IPD played by multiple (N ≥ 2) rational agents. While the co-action solution of the single-stage game does show that pure defection is not a rational outcome, for this it is necessary that the game situation is symmetric. We show that in the iterative situation, even when noise or the absence of symmetry causes agents to defect initially, information about earlier moves can help them to cooperate subsequently. We show that two rational agents playing IPD will follow a win-stay lose-shift strategy, thereby providing a rational basis to this Pavlovian behavioral rule that has been shown to be an effective strategy for playing IPD [27] . The N > 2 player case, that describes public goods dilemmas, shows that both cooperators and defectors can coexist, with the former always out-numbering the latter. Our results imply that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is rational for selfish individuals to cooperate even when there is temptation to act otherwise. Viewing multi-agent games from a coaction perspective also allows us to define a new class of strategic interactions where each "player" is a group of agents (characterized by their mutual symmetry), where the "players" act according to strategies that can be analyzed within a Nash framework.
II. THE CO-ACTION SOLUTION CONCEPT
The conventional Nash solution defines a set of strategy choices by all agents such that no agent gains by unilateral deviation, i.e., altering only her strategy. It is easy to see that in PD, mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium -which raises questions about how cooperation can arise in a group of selfish, rational agents. However, it has been shown recently by us in Ref. [26] that social dilemmas such as PD are a result of mutually inconsistent assumptions underlying the Nash framework for analyzing single-stage symmetric game. Specifically, it has been argued that assuming (a) each agent to be aware that all agents are equally capable of analyzing the game situation is inconsistent with the assumption that (b) agents can make unilateral deviations in their strategy, which is crucial for obtaining a dominant strategy in games like PD. Rectifying this problem leads to the concept of coaction equilibrium [26, 28] , where each agent realizes that she and the other agents are in a symmetric situation and hence whatever strategy choice she is going to make, other agents, being in the same symmetric situation and being equally rational as her, will make too. When applied to PD, as represented by the payoff matrix shown in Fig. 1 , co-action leads to a "cooperative" outcome in contrast to the Nash solution. In particular, for T ≤ 2R, agents always cooperate, while for T ≥ 2R, they cooperate with a probability p
. Therefore, the symmetry of the game allows the dilemma of PD to be resolved in the co-action framework.
The above argument does not take into account the possibility of previous interactions among the agents. In other words, there is no consideration of any memory of how the agents behaved in previous rounds (if any). However, many strategic interactions that arise in biological, economic and social contexts are iterative in nature, where individuals can engage with each other repeatedly. If the agents are capable of recalling how their opponents acted in earlier interactions, this information can be used by them to formulate their current strategies. The IPD, therefore, provides an ideal platform for investigating the evolution of cooperation between rational agents from the perspective of the co-action solution concept. In this framework, the knowledge gained from previous interactions can be used by agents to infer the existence of symmetry -even in the absence of any communication between them -which is the crucial ingredient for the co-action concept to apply. Generalizing the co-action framework to an iterative setting also allows its application to a wider class of non-cooperative game situations where symmetry between the players need not be assumed. For instance, consider the case where agents remember only the action in the last round by self and others. If a group of agents opted for the same action in the last round, they will consider each other to be symmetric in every respect and use the co-action argument. However, if the past actions of the agents are different, they are not in a symmetric situation and hence will use Nash-like reasoning. These ideas are illustrated in detail by first considering a two-player IPD before generalizing it to multiple players.
A. Two-agent IPD
The payoff matrix for two agents playing IPD is as shown in Fig. 1 . The value of the lowest payoff S is assumed to be zero without loss of generality. In addition, we consider the case 2R > T so as to rule out the possibility of a strategy in which agents take turns to alternately cooperate and defect. For the sake of clarity, we look at memory-one strategies where each agent has the knowledge of the choice made by all agents in the last play. Similar considerations will apply when extending the analysis to longer-memory strategies.
In the co-action equilibrium, the symmetry of the game situation as perceived by the agents governs their strategies. As the agents can recall their actions in the immediately preceding round of the game, if both had chosen the same action (i.e., CC or DD), this is recognized as establishing complete symmetry between the agents -in which case, they behave as in the single-stage PD co-action solution [26] . If, on the other hand, each had chosen a different action (i.e., CD or DC), then the agents realize that they are not in a symmetric situation and will resort to Nash-like reasoning.
To set out the argument in detail, we consider the four different possibilities that can arise during the course of the IPD, viz., (i) agent A cooperated while agent B defected (CD), (ii) both cooperated (CC), (iii) both defected (DD) and (iv) (iv) agent A defected while agent B cooperated (DC), in the last round. Thus, the state an agent is in at any given time could be any one of the following: |1 = |C, 1 , |2 = |C, 2 , |3 = |D, 0 and |4 = |D, 1 . In this notation, the first entry denotes whether the agent cooperated (C) or defected (D) and the second entry denotes the total number of agents who cooperated in the previous round. If p i denotes the probability with which an agent in state |i switches her action, we can express her expected payoffs W i in the different states by: Note that the payoff W 2 is a function of only p 2 and W 3 is a function of only p 3 , as, in the co-action framework, both the agents in these states (corresponding to CC and DD, respectively) are in a completely symmetric situation. Hence, the agents in state |2 (|3 ) will switch to defection (cooperation) with the same probability p 2 (p 3 ). It is easily seen that the values for p 2 and p 3 that maximize the respective payoff functions W 2 and W 3 are 0 and 1, respectively (corresponding to mutual cooperation).
For the states |1 and |4 (corresponding to CD and DC, respectively), where the agents are not in a symmetric situation, agent in state |1 will try to maximize W 1 by varying p 1 for any given value of p 4 while the agent in state |4 will seek to maximize W 4 by varying p 4 for any given value of p 1 . Using the same reasoning that is employed to obtain the Nash strategies, it is easy to see that the only mutually consistent choice for the optimal strategies of the two agents is p * 1 = 1 and p * 4 = 0 (corresponding to mutual defection). The optimal strategies for the agents in different states are summarized in Fig. 2 . Hence, the agents will resort to co-action thinking whenever they find themselves in a symmetric situation (as in CC or DD) while they use Nash-like reasoning in other situations (as in CD or DC). In the latter case, they will arrive at a symmetric situation in the next round (as they choose DD), and thereafter will mutually cooperate.
An important observation about the co-action solution of the two-person IPD discussed above is that the optimal strategy (Fig. 2 ) turns out to be the same as the win-stay lose-shift strategy for IPD proposed by Nowak and Sigmund [27] . This strategy has been shown to have certain advantages over the well-known tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy [1] for playing IPD, viz., it can correct for occasional mistakes in implementation of strategies and can exploit unconditional cooperators. More generally, win-stay loseshift (also referred to as Pavlovian) type of behavior has been widely observed in natural situations [29] , including experimental realizations of PD [30] . We would like to point out that unlike in earlier studies where the winstay lose-shift strategy is considered as a behavioral rule for agents, here we show that such a strategy emerges as the optimal solution for rational, selfish agents in the two-agent IPD.
B. N-agent IPD
We now consider an IPD with N agents, all of whom play with each other in every round. In each interaction between a pair of agents, individuals receive payoffs according to the matrix in Fig. 1 . As in the two-agent case, we assume that S = 0 and 2R > T . In addition, we set the "punishment" payoff P to 0 for simplicity (alternatively, one can consider P = ǫ ≪ 1 [18] ). The total payoff received by an agent in any round is the sum of the individual payoffs from each of the (N − 1) two-agent interactions. This ensures that all the agents receive a lower payoff if everyone defects than if they all cooperate, and if any agent switches from D to C, the average payoff of the agents increases.
The above situation describes public goods dilemmas where individual contributions towards a public good increases the collective benefit although the cost borne by an individual for this contribution exceeds the benefit she derives from it [5] . Note that the N -person IPD with N > 2 is not to be seen just as a simple quantitative change in the structure of the game, viz., by increasing the number of agents, but involves a profound change in the nature of the interactions [31] . Agents can react only to the combined effect of the actions of all other agents and not to the individual strategies of specific agents. The anonymity provided to individuals by the multi-player setting means that they are more likely to defect (i.e., act as free-riders) without much fear of retaliation by others [7] .
The state that an agent is in at any given time can be represented by either |C, n or |D, n according to whether she cooperated (C) or defected (D) in the previous round, with n denoting the total number of agents who cooperated in the previous round. In the co-action framework, the set of agents who played C in a particular round realizes that all of them who chose C are in a symmetric situation. Similarly, the set of agents who played D are aware of the symmetry among them. Thus, within each group, all agents will use identical strategies for the next round. For simplicity, we consider only pure strategies where agents choose either C or D with probability 1 [7, [32] [33] [34] .
Let us first consider the two extreme cases corresponding to either everyone cooperating or everyone defecting in the previous round. If all the agents had cooperated, they would realize that all of them would use identical strategies. The expected payoff of any agent is simply an integral multiple of W 2 (see Eq. 2), the corresponding payoff in the two-agent case studied earlier. Thus, on optimizing payoff, all agents choose C in the next round. By similar arguments, if all agents had chosen to defect in the previous round, they would choose C in the next round.
When some of the N agents cooperate and the others defect, we can treat the situation as identical to a two-player scenario, with the Nash equilibrium being the optimal strategy. Note however that each "player" is now a group of agents and the corresponding Nash solution is distinct from the one corresponding to everyone defecting as is obtained in a conventional 2-person PD. The expected payoffs of the two sets of agents can be conveniently represented by a two-player payoff matrix as shown in Fig. 3 . Here the row corresponds to the set of i agents (where i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1) who cooperated in the last round, while the column corresponds to the set of (N − i) agents who defected. In the next round, the row "player" can either choose to continue cooperating (C i ) or switch to defection (D i ). Similarly, the column "player" can switch to cooperation in the next round (C N −i ) or continue to defect (D N −i ). Thus, starting with any combination of cooperating and defecting agents, we can obtain the optimal strategies for the two sets of agents which depend on the ratio of the payoffs T /R for a given i.
Let us consider in turn the four possible situations in terms of the relative magnitudes of the payoffs for the two sets of agents: From  Fig. 3 , it is clear that cooperation is the optimal choice for both the sets of agents as neither will benefit by deviating from this strategy.
(ii) (N −1)R ≥ iT and (N −1)R < (N −i)T : It is easy to see that cooperation is the optimal choice for the column "player" independent of the action of the row "player", and using this information, one observes that the optimal choice for the row "player" would be to defect. Thus, the set of agents who cooperated in the previous round will switch to defection, while the set which defected will switch to cooperation. (iii) (N − 1)R < iT and (N − 1)R ≥ (N − i)T : Again it is easy to see that cooperation is the optimal choice for the row "player" independent of the action of the column "player", and using this information, one observes that the optimal choice for the column "player" would be to defect. The agents will therefore continue with the same actions as in the previous round. (iv) (N − 1)R < iT and (N − 1)R < (N − i)T : This situation arises only when i = N/2 (and hence only for even values of N ), i.e., when there are equal number of cooperators and defectors. For this case, there are two possibilities for the optimal action, one where the "players" continue with the same action as in the previous round, and, the other where each of them switches to the opposite action. Note that the level of cooperation does not change in either of the cases. For illustrative purpose, we now discuss in detail the analysis of the N -person IPD for the cases when N = 3, 4 and 5. In each of these cases, we shall denote the distinct states that are possible for the system to be in as S j where j = 0, . . . , N is the number of cooperators in that state.
For N = 3 agents, it is easy to see that in the co- action equilibrium, the optimal strategies will result in the following evolution between the distinct states of the system:
Thus, if all three agents had chosen the same action (C or D) in the previous round, all of them cooperate in the next round (S 3 ). In all the other cases, the system converges to the state S 2 corresponding to two cooperators and one defector. This result clearly distinguishes the co-action approach from the conventional Nash solution, which would have corresponded to all three defecting. A notable feature of the co-action solution is the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors (as in state S 2 ). For the case when N = 4, the optimal strategies will result in the following evolution between the distinct states of the system: S 0 → S 4 , S 1 → S 3 , S 2 → S 4 (if 3R ≥ 2T ) or S 2 → S 2 (otherwise), S 3 → S 3 and S 4 → S 4 . We can see that for N = 4 (unlike for N = 2 and 3) the solution begins to depend on the ratio of T to R, which is also true for all higher values of N .
As a final example, we consider the case when N = 5. Here the optimal strategies depend on whether the magnitude of the payoff values satisfy 4R > 3T . If this is true, it will result in the following evolution between the distinct states of the system:
On the other hand, if 4R < 3T , the following evolution will be observed:
Thus, we can draw the following general conclusions: (a) the state in which everybody cooperates (i.e., i = N ) is a stable state, (b) a state in which all but one agent cooperate (i = N − 1) is also a stable state, (c) states where the defectors are in a minority are stable if T /R > (N − 1)/(N − i) and (d) when the cooperators are in a minority, in the next iteration all agents will cooperate if T /R < (N − 1)/(N − i), otherwise they will switch their respective choices (from C to D and vice versa). In the special case when N is even with exactly half of the agents cooperating and T /R > 2(N − 1)/(N ), multiple equilibria are possible. The most important point to note from the above results is that cooperators can coexist with defectors, and moreover, always form a majority, in the co-action solution of the N -player IPD.
III. DISCUSSION
The symmetry between agents is a crucial ingredient for the co-action framework to apply in a game. In an iterative setting, agents become aware of their symmetry with other agents through the knowledge of their actions in previous encounters. The most important result of our study is that cooperators and defectors coexist in the coaction solution of the N -player IPD; moreover, the majority of agents cooperate. This is remarkable in view of the conventional wisdom that cooperation is extremely difficult to achieve in a group of selfish rational agents. For the case of two players, the co-action solution of IPD corresponds to the well-known win-stay lose-shift strategy that has been attested in animal behavior and social interactions [27] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the only approach that provides a rational game-theoretic basis for such a strategy. It is intriguing to consider the co-action solution for N -player IPD as the generalization of such Pavlovian strategies to the situation of multiple (N > 2) agents.
An important consideration in studies of IPD is the role of noise that can arise from the incorrect implementation of intended action by agents. Such noise may also be due to the misinterpretation of actions of other agents. For example, the TFT strategy in IPD is vulnerable to such noise as it cannot correct for occasional mistakes by agents. While for the case of two players it is known that the win-stay lose-shift strategy (which is the co-action solution for N = 2) is stable in the presence of noise, it is easy to see that even in the case of N > 2 agents, the co-action solution is not significantly affected by intermittent errors on the part of the agents.
The iterative game situation considered here corresponds to 1-step memory where the agents only retain information about the action of other agents in the immediately preceding round. The co-action concept can be easily extended to the more general situation of agents with longer memories, once the key question of how the symmetry among agents is to be defined in such situations is addressed. One possibility is that all agents who have cooperated an equal number of times in the past are considered to be in a symmetric situation. They will therefore adopt the co-action strategy in the next round. For two agents with finite memory, this will eventually lead to both of them cooperating. If there are more than two agents, the co-action principle suggests that those who display similar propensities to cooperate -i.e., they have cooperated an equal number of times in the pastwill form a group defined by complete symmetry among the agents comprising it. Thus, the entire set of N agents can be divided into a number of such "symmetry groups". This defines a novel class of strategic interactions where the "players" are the different symmetry groups (each consisting of one or more agents) playing according to strategies given by the Nash equilibrium. It is important to point out that this will not result in all agents resorting to defection as expected in the conventional Nash framework. Potentially, this new class of games can be used to analyze multi-agent strategic interactions in many different contexts. In passing, we also note that a comparison can be drawn between the co-action solution for N -player IPD and the maintenance of cooperation in spatial IPD games where the agents interact only with other agents in their local neighborhood [18] . In both, cooperation survives because of the formation of clusters of agents who cooperate thereby mutually supporting themselves against invasion by defectors.
It is intriguing to consider the implications of the coaction strategy for the behavior of individuals in realworld social interactions. As we show here, the stable solutions are those where a majority of agents cooperate, suggesting that the presence of a few defectors will not necessarily result in the breakdown of cooperation in a society. This is because rational agents who perceive each other to be similar, will not be deterred from cooperating as long as they receive enough mutual support -in the form of acts of cooperation -from similar agents. The co-action framework, therefore, implies that significant levels of cooperation will be seen in interactions among rational individuals in IPD-like situations, in contrast to the conventional wisdom. There have been a large number of experiments carried out with human subjects playing IPD (both the 2-person as well as the multiple-player version, viz., the repeated public goods game). Surveying the results reported in many experiments over several decades reveal that, both for the twoperson IPD [13] , as well as, the repeated public goods game [35, 36] , the majority of experimental subjects do not behave in the manner predicted by conventional game theory. As shown in this paper, the co-action paradigm provides a mechanism for a rational explanation of experiments on IPD not showing complete defection.
To conclude, we have shown that the co-action paradigm provides a new perspective to the evolution of cooperation. The co-action concept has been earlier shown to resolve social dilemmas in single-stage symmetric games. Here we show how the idea of co-action applies to the more general setting of iterative game situations. Information about previous interactions allows agents to infer symmetry (or its absence) among themselves, allowing cooperation to emerge even when agents had initially chosen to defect. The co-action framework also provides a rational basis for the win-stay lose-shift strategy that has been proposed for the two-person IPD, and generalizes such a strategy to the case of several agents. In general, we observe that cooperators and defectors can coexist in the N -player Iterated Prisoners Dilemma game, with the cooperators constituting the majority. This is a surprising feature given the conventional expectation that selfish, rational agents will always defect.
